Creole Hegemony in Caribbean Societies: The Case of Suriname

Ruben Gowricharn*
Tilburg University

Abstract
Evaluating the representation of the East Indian communities in the national political identity of Caribbean countries, and building on the discussion waged in Guyana and especially Trinidad and Tobago, this article elaborates on the example of Suriname. It argues that the Surinamese example differs from that of other countries in the region with respect to the ample opportunity the Indo-Surinamese community had to change their exclusion from political representation. A second distinguishing feature of Suriname is the uncontested Creole preponderance. Theoretically, the article differentiates the Gramscian concept of hegemony into contested, resisted, and accepted hegemony in order to capture the relations between the Indian communities and the national political identity. The article argues that part of the difference between these Caribbean countries, and more specifically, part of the self-restraint on the political agency of the Indian community in Suriname, can be attributed to these countries’ ideologies and specific demographic and political constellations.

I. Introduction
The last decades have witnessed a plethora of studies on Creolization that discuss the nature of Caribbean societies and related nationalism. Creolization, being a specific property of Caribbean nationalism, is ideologically and politically celebrated in the region because it is considered an alternative to a model of plural societies. That model supposedly consolidates the divide between ethnic groups, while Creolization allegedly is not only creative and innovative but also bridges the gulf between groups (Bolland 2002). The concept has many historical and theoretical ramifications and refers to different aspects of cultural and bodily mixing in the Caribbean, Latin America, and outside these regions (Collier and Fleischmann 2003; Hannerz 1996; Stewart 2007; Wade 2010). However, the concept has been widely discussed, including its theoretical stretch, its theoretical underpinnings, its

* Ruben Gowricharn is professor of social cohesion and transnational studies at Tilburg University, The Netherlands. He specializes in ethnic change, integration of ethnic minorities, the economics of diaspora, and democracy in multicultural societies.
alternate reference to a social process, and its ideological and theoretical use (Bolland 2005; Khan 2007b).

Leaving aside the national and historical specificities of separate Caribbean countries, originally Creolization refers to the outcome of the racial and cultural mixture of former slaves and whites. This goes especially for Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Suriname, which consist of large segments of descendants of former slaves and Indo Caribbeans. Political rivalry and cultural contrast between the Creole and non-Creole populations have become especially salient in these societies. It is important to note that at present the concept includes in local speech both racially and culturally mixed people, as well as seemingly unmixed people of black origin. In this article, the usage of Creolization is similar to the Creolization in the Caribbean countries mentioned and refers to a population rather than to a theoretical concept. In the countries mentioned, it is has been taken as an obvious fact that Creoles determined the content of the nationalism and, subsequently, the national identity of those societies. Hence, nationalism in the region becomes Creole nationalism (cf. Ledgister 2010).

This perspective on Afro-Creole nationalism has been questioned by Indians in the region. Several scholars, mostly but not exclusively of Indian origin, argue that the Creole perspective denies Indians access to national standing. More generally, non-Creolized groups are considered to fall outside the Creole ambit (Bolland 2002, 2005; Hintzen 2002, 2004; Khan 2004, 2007a, 2007b; Munasinghe 2001, 2002, 2005, 2006; Puri 2004; Raghunandan 2012; Reddock 2002). Most of these studies refer to Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, the two English-speaking societies in which the majority of the population consists of descendants of British Indian indentured labourers. The histories of these two countries corroborate this exclusion of Indians from equal and national political status, although their recent political history includes moments of collaboration; in Guyana, that exclusion was long and violent, and in Trinidad and Tobago, it was shorter and less violent. In both countries, Indians vehemently opposed the political status relegated to them. Indians have held significant political offices in both countries, and the Creole political identity and related nationalism have been altered due to Indo-activism (Hintzen 1997; Khan 2007b; Munasinghe 2001; Reddock 2002).

Conspicuously absent in this discussion about Creole identity and nationalism is Suriname, a Caribbean society similar to that of Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago by having Indians (nationally called Hindustanis) as the largest ethnic group. That absence may be attributed to the limitations of the Dutch language, but Surinamese scholarship also has less reason to address these issues. The country’s history differs in two crucial aspects from the Anglo-Caribbean societies mentioned. First, Hindustanis have not been excluded from political office, at least, not because they did not fit the Creole ideology. Except for a brief period during a military regime, Hindustanis’ political position in Suriname, as those of other ethnic groups, was determined by the outcome of elections. Second, although Creole politicians kept shaping Suriname’s political identity according to their cultures, Hindustanis never objected to this creation of a Creole national identity. The puzzle is this: in contrast to Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, and despite a Creole preponderance in national identity and nationalism, Surinamese
Hindustanis did not oppose their almost total exclusion at several levels of Surinamese politics. Note that the topic of this article is not Creolization but Creole nationalism – that is, the nationalism of the Creole group and how the Indo-Caribbean communities relate to it.

This article offers a more nuanced perspective on the relationship between Indo-Caribbeans and Creole nationalism. Building on the discussion waged in Guyana and especially in Trinidad and Tobago, it elaborates on the example of Suriname. It argues that the Surinamese case differs from that of other countries in the region with respect to Hindustanis’ limited exclusion from politics even while their exclusion at the level of national political identity is almost total. This Creole preponderance has been uncontested. That makes the Surinamese case similar and specific compared to Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago. Cases of peaceful relations between descendants of former British Indians and Creoles are rare. One such rare case is Mauritius (Carroll and Carroll 2000). However, the comparison stops at the ethnic composition of the population; both ideologically and institutionally, the political relations between the two groups are geared at maintaining ethnic peace. Moreover, in the case of Mauritius, the dominant group are the descendants of Indians.

Theoretically, the article employs the Gramscian concept of hegemony. However, it differentiates the Gramscian concept into contested, resisted, and accepted hegemony in order to capture the relations between the Indian communities in Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Suriname and the national political identity of these countries. Moreover, the article argues that part of the difference between these countries stems from the specific demographic and political constellations and the ideology of the Indian community in Suriname that has restraint their political agency.

A second objective of this article is to provide some background information to the English-speaking world about a case that is hardly considered in the region. I argue that Creole hegemony and identity may be imposed at four related levels: the level of politics, the level of ideology, the level of symbolism, and the level of public space. The exclusion of Hindustanis in Suriname occurs predominantly at the third and fourth levels. I hypothesize that an entrenchment and consequent consolidation of a Creole government in Suriname was preempted by either a stable democracy that enables the alternation of political parties, including those of the Hindustanis, or by a coup d’état that had the same intervening effect at a historical moment when this consolidation of Creole power was about to happen.

In the second section, I discuss the basic models of the Caribbean nations, exploring what exactly Creole identity is and how it excludes, arguing that its preponderance is a kind of ideological (or ethnic) hegemony which, by definition, has some counterpoints and contestation. The absence of contestation makes Suriname a highly exceptional case. To shed light on the preconditions of the Creole hegemony and the differences that distinguish Suriname from similar Caribbean countries, I outline some specificities of the Surinamese case in section three. The fourth section presents a thick description of the hegemony at the levels of politics, ideology, national symbols, and public space of Surinamese society. The fifth section focusses on the agency and ideology of the Hindustanis and offers
some explanations for the absence of any contestation. I conclude with some suggestions for further research.

II. Caribbean Models of National Identity

In the European tradition, scholars as diverse as Adam Smith, Karl Marx, and Émile Durkheim have implicitly or explicitly presumed that the unity of a spatially demarcated society is brought about by a social division of labour and a collective belief system enabling a collective consciousness. Hence, conceptually, the nation is integrated, culturally homogeneous, and autonomous. These properties of the European nation concept have served as the model to evaluate non-European societies. In the literature about nations and nationalism, the element of cultural homogeneity is special and highly featured. This point is most forcefully made by Anthony Smith (1986, 1991, 2000). He argues that nations are built around ethnic cores or dominant ethnicities. These dominant ethnicities furnish the nation with myths, symbols, and a public culture. Smith repeatedly states that nation formation is an evolution from pre-existing sentiments and symbols to national culture. He claims that territorial nations that are geographically bounded consist of a framework of law and institutions and are also cultural communities.

This presupposition also underlies the works of the British colonial official J.S. Furnivall, who introduced the concept of plural society to the scholarly world. Furnivall distinguished between homogeneous societies (European societies, although he did not mention this explicitly), societies with pluralistic features (e.g. Canada and the United States) and plural societies. According to him, a plural society is a medley of people, ‘for they mix, but do not combine. Each group holds by its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but only in the market-place, in buying and selling’ (Furnivall 1948:304–05). In an earlier work, Furnivall (1939:463) stated,

In a homogeneous society the basic problem of applied political science is how to provide most adequately for the expression of the social will . . . But in a plural society . . . it is impossible to provide a vehicle for the expression of social will until there is a society capable of will.

Precisely because of this absence of collective will, the social cohesion of the plural society is engendered by mutual economic dependency and state power. Here we find the opposite of the European conception of a normal society, ethnically divided and lacking a collective consciousness and a social will.

This conception of plural society was applied to the Caribbean by the Dutch scholar Rudolf van Lier (1971 [1949]) in his description of Surinamese social history. Van Lier adopted all the basic features mentioned by Furnivall (1948), although he mitigated some of them. For example, he argued that rather than being culturally homogeneous, all societies possess pluralistic features, thus diminishing the differences between the two types. Van Lier preferred the concept of ‘segmented society’, but this change of terminology did not alter any of the distinguishing features mentioned by Furnivall. Almost two decades later, the concept of plural society was applied by M.G. Smith (1965) to English-speaking Caribbean
societies. From that period on, plural societies featured as a separate concept in Caribbean social sciences (cf. Oostindie 2006).

The Creolization model is presented as an alternative to the plural society because of its fundamental feature of the ‘mixing’ as opposed to the ‘separation’ of (ethnic) groups. Creolization refers to a local culture that emerges out of contact between white masters and black slaves. Creole nationalism is a synthesis of European liberal nationalism and an identification with the colonized people of the West Indies. The strength of Creole nationalism, according to Ledgister (2010:25), is that it takes both the European origin of dominant institutions and the African origin of the dominated masses into account. This nationalism, developed by Caribbean thinkers such as C.L.R. James, Norman Manley, and Eric Williams, is intrinsically located on the white–black axis, and it acquired defining Afro-identity after independence. The markers of this nationalism differ from country to country but are unmistakeably Afro in origin and expression (Shepherd and Richards 2002). In Jamaica, the markers consist of significant Rastafari elements, while in Trinidad and Tobago, the markers include Chutney music, steel bands, and Carnival. These elements were initially the culture of the lower classes and were incorporated into the national culture.

Creolization operates as a social process that serves powerful ideological meanings and as a theory. Ideologically, it is advertised as innovative, creative, and harmonious and as a contribution to nation-building, making all people ‘one’; it is also celebrated for its mixing and hybridity (Puri 2004). However, it has been criticized for blurring class distinctions, being individual, and, most relevant for the topic of this article, having only ‘Afro content’. As Bolland (2005:189) put it, ‘when [C]reolisation is solely defined as the creation or assimilation of Afro-Creole culture, and put at the centre of Caribbean history, indigenisation and nationalism, all “others” become marginalised’. In Trinidad, the Creole mixing is expressed in the metaphor of a callaloo, a local dish, referring to heterogeneity in being homogenized and an equal representation of all elements (Khan 2004:8). This refers to a process of cultural homogenization or assimilation into Creole culture. Either you are assimilated or you are marginalized. It is marginalization that is the ‘quarrel’ of the Indo-Caribbeans.

How does the Creolization discourse exclude Indians from national status? The literature is not clear about this. Munasinghe (2001:3) offers a Trinidadian example where Creoles state that an Indo-Trinidadian can never become president of the nation, as he would have come from a ‘pure’ (uncreolized) group. The example makes clear that the effects of being not Creole are located mostly in the realm of acceptance and legitimate representation. Contestation at this level does not rule out political inclusion, as will be argued for the case of Suriname, but the effects of a dominant Creole national identity on non-Creolized groups require concrete specification. What is clear, however, is that the acceptance of the Indo-Caribbean population remains at best limited. Implicit in this discourse is the pressure to comply with Creole norms and markers and thus to mix and assimilate. The Creolization ideology can therefore be seen as the Caribbean variant of European assimilation and an attempt to create an ethnic core. It rests on an outdated model of the nation.
Scholars opposing this mixing pressure argue two related points. The first is that the Indian community has contributed to nation-building by Creolizing in its own way and on its own terms (Khan 2004; Munasinghe 2002; Raghunandan 2012). Indians’ exclusion from equal citizen status is therefore unjust and unwarranted. This is an argument driving at recognition and incorporation. The second point is that, referring to the ‘Indo-Creolization’ in Trinidad, the callaloo is reconceptualized as ‘tossed salad’, a Canadian variation of the salad bowl, picturing different groups with their own inherited culture and yet constituting a unity. This alternative to the callaloo nation claims inclusion while maintaining inherited identity without claiming ‘purity’. Although this discussion is extracted from the literature on Trinidad and Tobago, it applies also to the feeling dominant in Guyana (De Kruijf 2006; Hintzen 2002; Williams 1991).

At the conceptual level, the model of the plural society, the concept of the Creole nation and that of the tossed salad all presuppose separate ethnic groups that are either being amalgamated into one or that remain separate and connected by some degree of Creolization. The difference between the models is whether the distinct ethnic groups assimilate into the Creole culture or not. In Trinidad particularly, there is some reproach that Indians are ‘pure’, suggesting that they remained culturally unchanged since their immigration (Hintzen 2002; Khan 2004; Munasinghe 2002). This position is historically untenable. Regarding Suriname and Guyana, Gowricharn (2013) argues that the immigration lasted about half a century, during which time group formation took place. That process required major changes in the community, including the demise of the caste system and the development of a local vernacular. The question is not whether the Indian communities have been Creolized but the extent to which they should assimilate into the Afro culture in order to be accepted (Hintzen 2002).

A specific feature of Caribbean plural societies, never absent in history and receiving ample scholarly attention, is the development of transnational communities (Basch et al. 2003). Large segments of Indo-Caribbeans (as well as other ethnic groups) have maintained ties with their countries of origin, even generations after they have settled in the Caribbean. These transnational communities include people from the Caribbean who migrated to Western countries (cf. Gowricharn 2009; Trotz 2006). The proliferation of these transnational communities has powerful effects on basic concepts in the Creole discourse. The first is that due to ‘long-distance’ nationalism (Anderson 1992), citizens identify and participate in two or more communities. Increasingly, members of ethnic communities are straddling different countries and belong to different societies simultaneously, making them unlikely to assimilate fully in one country. The second effect is that the implicit model of a closed nation is defied; because of the transnational relations, the Creole discourse cannot be confined to one national arena.

Given the preference of the Indian communities for ‘tossed salad’ and increasing transnational ties, the desired national representation comes close to a modern version of the plural model. The difference with the old model of the Furnivall type is that the groups are culturally ‘tossed’ (cf. Puri 2004), and the state does not need to hold the groups together. In the postcolonial situation, the (Creole) state, rather than keeping groups together, kept them apart using Creole ideology and culture as
entry tickets to the national political arena. This definitional and exclusionary power warrants the concept of Creole hegemony.

Hegemonic power has been labelled differently in literature. Apart from a demographic preponderance and the use of violence, the dominance of one ethnic group over another has been approached as a ‘racial and ethnic hierarchy’ often encountered in colonial situations (Emerson 1960), ethnic hegemony (Jiobu 1988), ‘ideological hegemony’ (Gramsci 1971), and ‘cultural compromise’ (Wimmer 2002). The case of Suriname has moved beyond the ethnic hierarchy of the colonial situation. The concept of ethnic hegemony describes a situation in which an ethnic group achieves economic control over an important economic area that interfaces with the majority (Jiobu 1988:353), and this concept does not apply to the topic of this article. The concept of cultural compromise suggests that ethnic groups attempt to counterbalance the hegemony of the preponderant group by giving and gaining. This presupposes some negotiation, which is conspicuously absent in the history of Suriname, rendering such an approach invalid.

The Gramscian approach is more promising. Hegemony, as meant by Gramsci (1971; see also Roseberry 1996), can be described as a complex unity of coercion and consent, characterized by a temporary and fragile equilibrium. It is about struggle between groups and classes. Hegemony has been used by several authors (cf. Calhoun 1993; Roseberry 1996; Wimmer 2002) to describe the dominance of one ethnic group. However, the concept has not been widely specified to describe different types of ethnic hegemonies. One notable exception is Williams (1991), who elaborates on the distinction between transformationist and expansive hegemony in the case of Guyana. The transformationist form of hegemony changes the subject, while the expansive form extends the scale of hegemony. The transformationist form has a homogenizing impact, as is the case in the Creolization process. It should be noted that hegemonic forms can be intended or unintended by dominant groups, not per se being classes.

In Caribbean history, ethnic hegemony can be roughly typified as openly contested, as in Guyana (De Kruijf 2006; Hintzen 2004; Williams 1991; Wilson 2012), or as relatively passively resisted, as in Trinidad and Tobago (Eriksen 1991; Hintzen 2002; Wilson 2012). The Suriname case, however, differs from these two outcomes. Since the Creole preponderance in Suriname has not been resisted at all, I suggest calling this ‘accepted hegemony’. Accepted hegemony comes close to what Grosfoguel (2003:6) describes as ‘colonial situations’, meaning ‘the continuity of colonial forms of domination after the end of colonial administrations produced by colonial cultures and structures in the modern/colonial/capitalist world system’. This ethnic hegemony entails acculturation and enables one ethnic group to determine the nature and limits of issues in the public debate, implying the possession of definitional power. Because ethnic hegemony has a culturally and politically homogenizing impact and directs the scale and direction of acculturation, it tends to dissolve the subaltern groups.

In the Gramscian concept of hegemony, the preponderance is never total. There is always some room for manoeuvre and counter-hegemony. These can be open or hidden, highly ritualized or driven underground, but it is considered a safe theoretical assumption that there is some countervailing force present. Wertheim
(1974), in explaining revolutionary upsurges, outlines this perspective and speaks of ‘counterpoints’ that may suddenly flicker and overthrow the status quo. A similar perspective is adopted to explore hidden or overt forms of contestation of the Hindustanis in Suriname. As the argument of this article reveals, there were none.

The different outcomes raise the question of whether the Indian communities had a different agency. Khan (2007b:657), commenting on the Trinidadian case, argues that the dominance of national symbols is the outcome of decades of struggle: ‘Far from being the result of a neutral inexorable, and admirable process of “creolization”, these self-evidently appropriate national symbols were, in different times and for different reasons, rendered Creole-callaloo through power struggles among agents who had conflicting stances on state power and operation.’

The outcome of an accepted hegemony raises the question of whether the Indian communities in the different countries had the same degree of agency and ideology. Since the Surinamese Hindustani community is the largest ethnic group and is represented in politics, the occurrence of agency can safely be assumed to be present. The issue then boils down to why the Hindustanis refrained from any contestation of their exclusion from representation in the national political identity.

III. Surinamese Specificities

Until the middle of the nineteenth century, Suriname was a plantation colony, exploited with black slaves. After the abolition of slavery in 1863, indentured labourers from British India and Java were imported to increase the labour supply for the plantations and to enlarge the small population. The descendants of the black slaves (called Creoles, together with all their mixtures) and those of the British Indians and Javanese constitute the major groups. In the past decades, the Maroons have been the quickest growing segment of the population. According to the latest census (2012), they have become the fourth largest group and are about to surpass the Javanese. Other groups that have entered the country are Chinese, Lebanese, white settlers, Jews (van Lier 1971 [1949]), and, later, Guyanese and Brazilians. The history of this former plantation colony differs in a few respects from that of similar countries in the region.

One specificity of Suriname’s ethnic composition is that the three major groups were distributed along sectorial lines. The bulk of the ‘Asians’ was confined to the agricultural sector, while the blacks became concentrated in gold mining and forestry. This relative social and economic isolation eased the reconstitution of ethnic groups. Family pattern, language, religion, and customs were adjusted and retained and were later supplemented with ethnic-specific schools, media, and other community-specific facilities. These ethnic groups became the constitutive units of the Surinamese plural society. The size of the groups changed in due course. By the early 1970s, the Hindustanis appeared to be demographically the largest ethnic group, and they have kept that position ever since. In the post-war period, this plural order was rationalized as ‘unity in diversity’.

A second distinguishing feature is the complex political spectrum. In an attempt to prevent the Indonesians from cooperating with the Japanese during WW II, the
Dutch Queen Wilhelmina promised the colonies more domestic autonomy. This included the introduction of universal franchise. Anticipating this change, the ethnic groups in Suriname began to organize themselves politically. In spite of large urbanization causing a breakdown of the ethnic division of labour, most political parties were founded on ethnic bases. A light-skinned Creole elite that was then in power established the Protestant-oriented National Party of Suriname (NPS). The Roman Catholic Creoles established the Progressive People’s Party (PSV). The Hindustanis formed the United Hindustani Party (VHP) and the Javanese organized themselves into the Kaum Tani Persatuan Indonesia (KTP). These were the political parties from which later splits emerged (Dew 1978). The number of political parties – both major and splits – increased steadily. The complexity of the political spectrum increased, as the Maroons also established several political parties. This complex and politically organized diversity enabled many combinations of ethnic coalitions, a feature that is far less conspicuous in Caribbean politics.

A third specificity concerned the political status of the country. In 1954, Suriname obtained the status of an equal member of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. It met the criteria of the trias politica but was curtailed in a few respects. The country was responsible for its domestic affairs, but the Dutch supervised governance and commanded the military. Suriname also became part of the world community of nations. It was represented in multilateral bodies and had its own diplomatic corps, together with a flag and an anthem. Economically, the country was highly dependent on bauxite exports and development aid from the Netherlands. It had its own currency, which, at that time, was twice the value of the Dutch guilder. This hybrid situation was rationalized with the philosophy that the country was still in an infant stage and should develop to maturity before gaining independence. Independence was achieved in 1975, compared to 1966 in Guyana and 1962 in Trinidad and Tobago.

A fourth specificity is the weak Surinamese nationalism that accounts for the late independence. Its pedigree was ethnic and a response to the repression of black culture by the colonizer. This movement started after World War I and carried over after World War II into a movement of black students in the Netherlands. Later, these students founded the Party of the Nationalist Republic (PNR), which aimed for constitutional independence. The party consisted exclusively of Creoles. The PNR was thus both an ethnic and a nationalistic movement (Marshall 2003). However, while the PNR can be labelled a single-issue party, this was different from the largest Creole party, the National Party of Suriname (NPS). The NPS also had a nationalist orientation, which was much weaker, while its goal of achieving independence was located in the longer term. Until the 1970s, the NPS shared the philosophy with the Hindustanis that the country was not ripe for independence.

After having defeated the light-skinned Creole elite in 1958, the black Creoles took over power in the NPS. Together with the Hindustani VHP, they formed a broad-based cabinet from 1958 to 1967. In the next elections, the NPS ‘adopted’ a split-off from the VHP as a coalition partner. The government fell two years later, and the next election was won by the VHP. It formed a coalition with a split-off from the NPS, the People’s National Party (PNP) and two other smaller parties.
The troubled relationship between the VHP and NPS worsened in this period, however. During the election campaign in 1973, the NPS and PNR joined forces against the VHP. The NPS–PNR bloc won the elections (thirteen and four seats respectively, out of thirty-nine), and soon after their cabinet was formed, they declared their aim to realize constitutional independence no later than 1975. This was a shock, as independence had never been an issue in Surinamese politics (Marshall 2003; Meel 1998; Ramsoedh 1993).

Related to the previous specificity is the issue of the initiative that set the independence process in motion. It would be wrong to infer that independence was the outcome of the nationalist politics, although it is reasonable to assume that the PNR accelerated the process. Already by 1971, the Dutch government had insisted on the independence of her colonies in the Caribbean. Meel (1998:657) advances three reasons for this: the labour unrest in the Netherlands Antilles in 1969 that necessitated the deployment of the Dutch navy; the growing negative international image of the Netherlands as a colonial power; and the swelling stream of Surinamese immigrants in the Netherlands. When the NPS–PNR government declared its aim to achieve independence, it implemented previously addressed Dutch concerns. Independence was not an expressed goal of the Surinamese people, but it was the aim of the small PNR.

As a result, the Surinamese experience differed markedly from the British Caribbean experience. Countries in that region experienced a substantive anti-colonial struggle, which was headed by Creole elites (Ledgister 2010). Hegemonic Creole nationalism became closely linked with a discourse about development and the acquisition of social and economic capital (cf. Hintzen 1997). In Suriname, however, shortly after the Second World War, the Dutch embarked on a development programme that catered to the need for investment capital as aid. They also started Round Table Conferences to grant Suriname and the Dutch Antilles equal rights; these were included in the Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1954. Ethnic politics in Suriname occurred within these economic and political conditions, shaping Creole and other ethnicities as highly domestic and autonomous forces. These conditions also fostered participation in government, which was regulated by parliamentary rules (Gowricharn 2012). As a result, state bureaucracy expanded, predominantly to accommodate its own ethnic group rather than from developmental concerns.

A sixth specificity distinguishing Suriname from Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago is the impact of a military coup. In 1980, five years after independence, a conflict between the military and the NPS government escalated in a coup d’etat, led by Dési Bouterse. The Dutch government condemned the coup but maintained relations with the new government. Small leftist parties cooperated with the military. Domestically, the military – predominantly Creoles – increasingly abused citizens’ rights. This provoked mounting criticism from several corners of society. The military accused the Netherlands and the United States of directing the opposition. The opposition swelled but was broken in 1982 by the killing of fifteen influential members. As a consequence, the Dutch suspended their development aid to Suriname. Together with the fall of the international bauxite prices at the time, this caused a severe foreign exchange problem and a subsequent stagnation.
of imports. Politically and economically, the military became isolated. Soon they started negotiating their unpunished retreat from politics. Bouterse and his fellow soldiers resigned, and in 1987, the first elections were held (Hoogbergen and Kruijt 2005).

A seventh difference distinguishing Suriname from similar Caribbean countries is the continued encapsulation of the Creole nationalism after the retreat of the military. From 1987 to 1996, the NPS and VHP were the major parties in the government. Bouterse had established the National Democratic Party (NDP) and was elected to Parliament. The NPS and VHP became the ‘democratic’ allies of the Western world and made it clear that their cooperation was not a kind of consociationalism to preempt ethnic conflict but to consolidate democracy by preventing Bouterse from growing in power. However, Bouterse’s popularity increased, especially among youngsters, because of his capacity to mobilize anti-Western or anti-Dutch feelings and because the ethnic-based parties did not do much to arrest the deteriorating economic conditions. Bouterse’s NDP fought on two fronts: against the traditional ethnic parties (whose economic policy had engendered dissatisfaction on a wide scale and provoked an IMF intervention) and against her foreign allies. The latter gained increasing political relevance. The Netherlands accused Bouterse of a number of offenses, including murder during his military rule and drug trafficking. After years of preparation, during which Bouterse repeatedly claimed publicly that the Dutch were harassing him, he stood trial in the Netherlands. Out of eleven charges, he was sentenced in absentia only for drug trafficking.

Given this political history, Creolization became first and foremost the process of uniting the Creoles as an ethnic political group, the most radical wing represented by the PNR. However, the type of nationalism that emerged as a result of the military intervention was different from the black ethnic chauvinism of the PNR. The Creole nationalism evolved from an anti-colonial nationalism represented by a black ethnic group to a dominant Creole nationalism pretending to represent the whole nation. Note that Creole nationalism grew after the granting of constitutional independence, not before, when the military rulers had to countervail foreign pressure. This nationalism was motivated by preserving the military rather than by anti-colonialism to achieve independence. Ideologically, the ‘new’ Creole nationalism was anti-ethnic and anti-Western rather than anti-colonial. Since the Creole military developed the Creole nationalism, this ethnic group managed to define the nation’s image. These specific features account for the differences between Creole nationalism in Suriname and those in similar Caribbean countries, both in terms of the functions fulfilled and its mode of development.

IV. Creole Political Hegemony

In Suriname, the Creole political hegemony is a vexatious issue. The phenomenon is denied, contradicted, or justified by many Creoles. They feel economically outcompeted against by the Hindustanis, who are well represented in business and intellectual professions. The hegemony is also ignored, if not denied, by an
increasing number of Hindustanis to safeguard ethnic peace and by nationalists of all ethnic groups who consider Creole culture a normal part of Suriname’s national identity. Nagle and Clancy (2012) argue that a shared public space and identity cements the segments in divided societies. However, the issue here is that the sharing is not on an equal footing, not even when the demographically largest group, the Hindustanis, is in power. Listed below are a number of issues that are distinguished at four levels: the level of politics, the level of ideology, the level of symbolism, and the level of public space.

**Politics**

At the political level, the hegemony is built into the electoral system. With its introduction in 1948, the light-skinned Creole elite then in power ruled that ten out of the twenty-one parliamentary seats should be assigned to the capital city of Paramaribo, the domain of the Creole elite, and three to areas with a majority of Creoles (Sedney 2010:32). Hindustanis and Javanese, although they constituted the majority of the population, were systematically disadvantaged in spite of their residential clustering in the rural districts. Since then, the electoral system has been adjusted a few times as a compromise between the Creole and Hindustani parties, thus diminishing the electoral preponderance of the Creoles (Dew 1978; Ooft 1972). However, in the elections of 2010, Creole hegemony still prevailed: districts with small populations of Creoles – such as Coronie, Brokopondo, and Marowijne – could acquire parliamentary seats with numbers of votes varying from 800–2,600, while mixed or predominantly Hindustani areas such as Paramaribo and Wanica needed 6,300 and 7,500 votes, respectively (Sedney 2010).

Another political issue pertained to the increasing use of the local lingua franca as a semi-official language. Already during the military rule, Bouterse and his fellow nationalists had started to suppress Dutch as the official vernacular by mixing it with or using solely negro-English (the outdated name of Suriname’s lingua franca) in their speeches. The language was dubbed ‘Sranan Tongo’ (Suriname’s language), enabling nationalists to claim official national status for it and ignoring the fact that every ethnic group has its own language. In due course, the Creole hegemony increased in strength and Sranan Tongo acquired the function of an instrument of mass mobilization. The official language of Suriname is Dutch, but now it is claimed – with considerable success, incidentally – that Sranan Tongo should be spoken by all ethnic groups as a token of genuine Surinamesehood.

This practice was adopted by Creole and other politicians in the post-military period. On radio and television, at official occasions, in deliberations in parliament, and in meetings of the council of ministers, Sranan Tongo is increasingly used as a semi-official language. The Creole hegemony is also reflected in the appointment of disproportionate numbers of Creole cabinet members and high officials. Its preponderance continued after the elections of 2000 and 2005, which were won by a coalition consisting of the traditional NPS and VHP. The same holds after the election of 2010, when the NPS lost devastatingly and the NDP gained unexpected supremacy. The continuity in Creole orientation, in spite of Hindustani
individuals or representatives of political parties being part of the government, increased.

**Ideology**

At the level of ideology, there were remarkable shifts. Initially, ethnic plurality was rationalized by the ideology of ‘unity in diversity’. Any attempt at assimilation was rejected, even by Afro-nationalists at the time (including the PNR), who were then fighting for the recognition of their repressed culture. At the same time, blacks had a desire to assimilate, which stemmed partly from the European idea that nations should consist of a racially and culturally homogeneous people and partly from low self-esteem as a result of slavery (Breeveld 2006). The ideal nation model was advertised by a movie produced in the early 1970s, entitled *Wan Pipel*, in which a black man and a Hindustani woman were engaged in a forbidden love affair. Oddly enough, the ‘*wan pipel*’ (‘one people’) ideology was launched by the PNR activist Dobru. The movie is still shown on television around Independence Day. To this advertised biological assimilation, language assimilation should be added.

During the military rule, the nationalist orientation shifted from the ‘unity in diversity’ to the ‘one people’ ideology and the mixing of races as the ultimate symbol of nationalism. That was politically underscored in 1996 by the NDP that became the lead partner in a new government. Referring to the ethnic diversity of its members and constituency, the NDP claimed to be a truly national party that transcended the ‘narrow interests of the ethnic parties’ and referred to the mixture of people from different ethnic backgrounds in her own circles.

Informally, the national ideology – being truly nationalist = mixing – characterized the ethnically mixed parties. Most of them were small leftist parties, but it was the NDP that made a major breakthrough in this area. This party is comparable with the Congress Party in India and the ANC in South Africa and consists of informal ethnic compartments. It resembles a consociational government; hence, the term ‘consociational party’ (Bogaards 2005). During elections, the different compartments of the NDP mobilize their respective ethnic constituencies. However, most of the influential politicians of this party are of Creole descent. In party meetings, the music, language, and national image are all Creole. Creole hegemony continues, even in the NDP. The dominant ideology is no longer ‘unity in diversity’ but mixing and accepting the Creole identity as the national identity. The success of this hegemony was underscored by the election of Bouterse as president in 2010 and 2015, and is too easily interpreted as a breakdown of ethnicity (cf. Marchand 2014).

**National Symbols**

At the symbolic level, the hegemony was solidified. During the 1960s, there was some discord about the image of a Creole woman in traditional Creole dress on Surinamese banknotes, about the flag – which formerly consisted of five stars – symbolizing ethnic groups held together by an ellipse and about the anthem. The banknotes were replaced, and so was the flag after independence. About one-third
of the new flag contained the colour green, the colour of the dominant Creole party (NPS) at that time. None of the remaining colours in the flag match the colours of other major ethnic political parties. The ethnic relevance of the national anthem, which contains a Dutch verse followed by a verse in Sranan Tongo, has also increased. This anthem remained after independence and became compulsory for schoolchildren. However, the usual practice is that in most cases, as on many official occasions, only the Creole verse of the national anthem is sung. Some Hindustani organizations have requested in vain a verse in their own language. On many occasions, Hindustanis, Javanese, and members of other ethnic groups increasingly choose to sing the anthem in Sranan Tongo, skipping the first verse in Dutch.

Public Space

The public space in Paramaribo almost totally reflects the Creole hegemony. In the centre of the capital city, all major streets are named after Creole politicians. The two important road named after a Hindustani are the Jaggernath Lachmonstraat, located in the outskirts of Paramaribo and the Johannes Mungrastraat, located closer to the centre of the city. Regarding public buildings the hegemony is total: the Johan Adolf Pengel Airport, the Anton de Kom University, the Frank Essed Building, and even the Wijdenbosch Bridge are all named after Creole politicians. No Hindustani or Javanese is awarded such an honour. Creole persons are symbolized with big statues, which are often placed in the centre of the city. Statues of other ethnic persons are significantly smaller, and just a few of them are also in the centre of the city, thus increasing the unequal image of the two dominant groups.

Public holidays are another issue in Surinamese politics. Initially, public holidays consisted of Christian celebrations, New Year, Emancipation Day, and Labour Day. In the early 1970s, two Hindu celebrations were turned into public holidays of which one is recently withdrawn and replaced by a Muslim holiday.

As do many other Caribbean countries, Suriname also advertises the country as a society with ‘many cultures’, referring to East Indians, Javanese, Chinese, Maroons, Lebanese, Brazilians, etc. In tourism and in foreign policy, the diversity appears to be a marketable commodity. However, during big events, this diversity is lost in the Creole culture. For example, Carifesta is an annual Caribbean festival that is alternately hosted by the government of one of the Caribbean countries. In 2013, it was Suriname’s turn. During this festival, all ethnic groups perform cultural acts. However, the composition of the event is overwhelmingly Creole, both in terms of time and number of acts, with the other ethnic groups being only marginally represented. The same holds for public events and television reports of these happenings; the Creole culture dominates, and the plurality of the nation is hardly represented.

Part of the public space consists of the official image of the country. Government information concerning the public at large is increasingly conveyed in Sranan Tongo rather than in Dutch, including official and private advertisements on television. The same holds for signs in public places and on public vehicles like ambulances. Private institutions also follow this trend. On billboards and on
television, commercial messages are designed according to the ‘one people’ ideology, almost always represented by a Creole man and a Hindustani or Javanese woman and seldom the reverse. While the tourist industry of Suriname proudly advertises the ‘unity in diversity’ of the country, the images of the population in official buildings and advertisements are dominated by Creoles and Maroons. That holds true even for the description of Paramaribo on the Internet. For example, the description of Paramaribo on the Dutch version of Wikipedia mentions about a hundred well-known persons who were born in Suriname. Of that number, just six are of Hindustani descent, two are Chinese, and none are Javanese.

In Suriname, although it is ‘everywhere’, ethnicity has become a taboo topic in public discussion. Raising issues of importance for ‘Asian’ ethnic groups is dismissed as ‘racist’, ‘ethnic’, or ‘anti-national’. It has become a widespread belief that being ‘ethnic’ is the opposite of being ‘nationalist’. Being a true Surinamese has come to mean mixed marriages, speaking Sranan Tongo, and behaving like Creoles. These have become the core values of the Surinamese nation. Hindustanis and Javanese have been taught that this is ‘modern’ and ‘national’. If they want to relinquish their backwards peasant background, they should become ‘modern’ or ‘Creole’ or ‘Surinamese’, which are synonymous. This Creole hegemony has been extremely effective. The younger-generation Hindustanis and Javanese hardly converse anymore in their ethnic languages or in Dutch. Many of them proudly say that they are first and foremost Surinamese and then Hindustani or Javanese. Creoles never make similar statements; for them, being Creole and being Surinamese are one and the same thing. In sum, Creole identity has become Suriname’s national identity, and the Creole hegemony has been uncontested and accepted by all other ethnic groups.

V. Uncontested Hegemony

Sections three and four have discussed how, given the flaws in the electoral system, access to political power depends on the elections. Foreign observers have always found the elections to be properly conducted. So whatever the parliamentary position of the Hindustanis (as represented by the VHP and her splits), and bypassing the unfavourable outcome of an unjust electoral system, their position in formal politics does not depend on the dominance of Creole culture. Even when Creole-dominated parties such as the NDP are in power, Hindustani individuals most often are included. That makes the exclusion of Hindustanis at the level of political identity a bewildering fact. How does one account for this uneven representation? One may argue that, at times, Hindustanis had the power to change the representation but did not take that opportunity. I argue that the agency was there, although it was intrinsically limited by the nature of coalition politics. However, more important than this external limitation of the agency has been the political ideology of the VHP itself. But let me start with the ideology of the Creoles.

In the literature, arguments to deny ethnic group entitlements by claiming a ‘naturalized’ right have been an effective legitimization (cf. Eriksen 1991). In that respect, Creoles claim erroneously that they were the first in the country (whereas
the first were the Amerindians, and the second were the white colonizers). This argument of ‘first arrival’ appeals to a semi-autochthonous argument that neglects the economic, political, and cultural contributions of other groups. According to a second argument, the Hindustanis are particularly unwilling to integrate into Surinamese society. Creoles refer to the salience of the Hindustanis as an ethnic group, being unmixed, and to the Hindustanis’ transnational bonds. Similar arguments and expectations have been voiced in the case of Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana (Munasinghe 2002; Hintzen 2002, 2004). In the view of the Creoles, Hindustanis are not full-fledged Surinamese citizens as long as they consider themselves an ethnic group. The underlying claim is that the Creoles do not constitute an ethnic group.

Because of the high fragmentation of political parties and the necessity of entering into coalitions, most often with two minor (Hindustani or Javanese) parties, the Creole political parties have to make concessions. Thus, Creoles can never have sole governmental control. The presence of these ‘third parties’ reduces the chance for racial polarization and prevented a long-lasting entrenchment of a Creole government. The only exception was the NPK government during 1973–1977, an idiosyncratic outcome of the electoral system, and a temporary ethnic polarization (Gowricharn 2012). The first NPK government was enabled by the support of a Javanese party, while in the second NPK government, a small Hindustani party also joined the coalition. Still, the danger of a consolidation of that NPK government was not ruled out because after 1977, the second NPK government was not inclined to hold new elections. Among Surinamese commentators, it is often speculated that the coup d’état in 1980 was a blessing in disguise because it ousted an anti-Hindustani, predominantly black government. After the military retreat, a ‘fresh start’ could be made by all parties.

The passive and evasive attitude of the Hindustani VHP contributed significantly to the Creole hegemony. Hindustanis as a group hardly participate in public discussions, and they never raise issues and concerns about Creole domination. Therefore, the public voices, or the only voices, are Creoles. The VHP rationalized the passivity with the analogy of a reed that bends and survives when it storms, while a kapok tree gets uprooted. This philosophy, which held sway for almost half a century during the Hindustani leadership of the late Jaggernath Lachmon, evades confrontation over and discussion about vexatious issues. After Lachmon’s death, the reed-bending philosophy was succeeded by a ‘shanti’ (peace) philosophy, with the same effect. The origin of this evasive policy stems most likely from the race riots in the 1960s in neighbouring (then) British Guyana. In Surinamese politics, these occurrences have been suggested as horrible outcomes when the Creoles would get too upset, a situation that the Hindustani aimed to prevent at any cost. This attitude has become a political reflex, a political habitus, if you like, which has weakened a critical attitude of the Hindustanis to the extent that the decision about and proclamation of Hindu and Muslim religious holidays as national holidays was conducted by the Creole PNP. The opportunity for Jaggernath Lachmon to become prime minister in 1973 and president of the nation after the restoration of democracy was also declined because of the fear of displeasing the Creoles.
The transformationist hegemony of Creoles has been extremely successful. The number of Hindustanis who endorse the Creole hegemony is increasing, as is the douglarization (‘douga’ signifies the offspring of Creoles and Hindustanis) of Surinamese society. This increasing Creolized segment of Hindustanis and Javanese consider the Creole preponderance simply as genuine nationalism. In Suriname, there is no discord, not even remotely, about these issues as there is in Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago. Note that the hegemony not only transforms Hindustani or Javanese ethnicity into Creole ethnicity, but it has become expansive while it simultaneously homogenizes the population culturally. With the expansion of this segment, the forces that might question the Creole representation are weakening. In terms of political identity, Suriname will likely remain a Creole nation.

VI. Conclusion

This article dealt with the hegemony of Creole culture in the political identity of Caribbean nations, resulting in the partial and uneven exclusion of the East Indian populations. While the situation in Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago has improved in the last few decades, it has worsened in Suriname. Creole culture has determined the national identity and dominates the public space in Suriname. But in contrast to Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, there was no blockade preventing Hindustanis from assuming political offices, nor was there any hindrance to access to resources. The peculiarity of Suriname consists in Hindustanis having had ample room to improve their national representation, yet they did not do so. They accepted the Creole hegemony without question. Therefore, the form of hegemony is denoted as ‘accepted hegemony’. Arguably, this accepted hegemony enables both a transformative and an expansive Creole hegemony.

The case of Suriname reveals that it is necessary to differentiate between the forms of hegemony as resisted, contested, and accepted. The accepted hegemony was not because the community in question was overpowered or suppressed by Creoles. To the contrary, the Surinamese Hindustani community had ample opportunity to raise concerns about or to change their national representation. As argued, the resistance to Creole hegemony depends very much on the demographic and political specificities of the researched country and the ideology of the Indian community. These forces enlarge or limit the agency of the opposition to the Creole hegemony. While the case of Suriname has suggested the forces that caused a stifling effect of political opposition to the hegemony, comparative studies between Suriname, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago may reveal what conditions have limited and enabled successful opposition. In such a comparison, the Hindustani ideology and adopted strategy should be taken into consideration.

I have not taken into consideration the fact that plural societies outside the Caribbean have similar or contradicting outcomes; for example, Mauritius, where a Hindu majority makes a painful effort to accommodate smaller ethnic groups. The focus of this research has been directed to cases where groups have been excluded. The case of Mauritius addresses other examples to look at or to compare to, namely where other groups are deliberately included rather than excluded. This suggests that there is much research to be done on nationalism in plural societies.
Note


References


